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Which Torts in Violation of the
Law of Nations?
BYWILLIAM S. DODGE*
The Alien Tort Statute's language is simple. As presently
codified, it says: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of
any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of
the law of nations or a treaty of the United States."' Since Filartiga v.
Pena-Iral in 1980, foreign victims of human rights abuse have
successfully relied on this provision to sue their foreign persecutors in
U.S. court for torts such as torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment,4  summary execution' arbitrary detention,6  causing
disappearance,7 genocide,8 and war crimes.9  In the mid-1990s, a
"second wave"10 of alien tort suits began. The defendants in these
suits are corporations-often U.S. corporations-and the complaints
* Associate Professor, University of California, Hastings College of the Law.
My thanks to Rick Herz for comments on an earlier draft.
1. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1993). As originally enacted in the first Judiciary Act, the
provision read: "the district courts shall have.., cognizance, concurrent with the
courts of the several States, or the circuit courts, as the case may be, of all causes
where an alien sues for a tort only in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the
United States." Judiciary Act, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 76-77 (1789). For a discussion of
the Alien Tort Statute's origins, see William S. Dodge, The Historical Origins of the
Alien Tort Statute: A Response to the "Originalists," 19 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L.
REv. 221 (1996).
2. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
3. Id.; Trajano v. Marcos, 978 F.2d 493,500 (9th Cir. 1992).
4. Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 187 (D. Mass. 1995); Paul v. Avril, 901
F. Supp. 330,335 (S.D. Fla. 1994).
5. Xuncax, 886 F. Supp. at 184.
6. Id.
7. Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 694 F. Supp. 707,709-11 (N.D. Cal. 1988).
8. Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232,241-43 (2d Cir. 1995).
9. Id.; Doe I v. Islamic Salvation Front, 993 F. Supp. 3, 8 (D.D.C. 1998).
10. Curtis A. Bradley, Customary International Law and Private Rights of Action,
1 CHI. J. INT'LL. 421,425 (2000).
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have tended to allege different kinds of torts, including forced labor,"
environmental torts 2 and "cultural genocide."'3 In this paper, I deal
not with whether any of the specific torts alleged in the second wave
of alien tort litigation fall within the scope of the Statute,4 but with
the standard a court should apply to determine which torts in
violation of the law of nations are actionable. This is an important
question, and logically precedes the question of whether any
particular tort is actionable, yet it has received relatively little
attention from courts and commentators.
There are at least four possible standards courts might utilize to
determine which torts in violation of the law of nations are
actionable. The most expansive would be to read the Alien Tort
Statute as authorizing the federal courts not just to apply customary
international law established by existing state practice but to create
new law, analogizing to Lincoln Mills v. Textile Workers.5 The
Filartiga court noted this possibility but did not need to adopt it, 6 and
no court has done so subsequently.'7 A second possibility would be to
read the Alien Tort Statute, in accordance with its plain language, to
extend to all torts in violation of the law of nations determined in the
usual way-by state practice followed out of a sense of legal
obligation. This seems to be what Filartiga intended, although only
11. See, e.g., Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 110 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1308-10 (C.D. Cal.
2000); Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d 424, 441 (D.N.J. 1999).
12. See, e.g., Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 197 F.3d 161, 166 (5th Cir. 1999);
Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 1994 WL 142006, at *6-7 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 11, 1994); Amlon
Metals, Inc. v. FMC Corp., 775 F. Supp. 668, 670-71 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
13. See, e.g., Beanal, 197 F.3d at 168.
14. For discussion of these questions, see, e.g., Richard L. Herz, Litigating
Environmental Abuses Under the Alien Tort Claims Act: A Practical Assessment, 40
VA. J. INT'L L. 545 (2000); Sarah H. Cleveland, Global Labor Rights and the Alien
Tort Claims Act, 76 Tax. L. RaV. 1533 (1998).
15. 353 U.S. 488 (1957).
16. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 887 (2d Cir. 1980).
17. Some courts have relied on Lincoln Mills not to fashion new rules of
international law but to fashion remedies in alien tort suits. See, e.g., Abebe-Jira v.
Negewo, 72 F.3d 844, 848 (11th Cir. 1996); In re Estate of Marcos Human Rights
Litigation, 910 F. Supp. 1460, 1469 (D. Haw. 1995), affd sub nom. Hilao v. Estate of
Marcos, 103 F.3d 767, 777 (9th Cir. 1996).
18. The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law defines customary
international law as "a general and consistent practice of states followed by them
from a sense of legal obligation." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW § 102(2) (1987). In determining the content of that law, courts look primarily to
state practice but also to judicial and arbitral decisions and to the writings of scholars.
See id. § 103 & cmt. a; Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art.
38, 59 Stat. 1055; see also United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 160-61
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one court has expressly adopted this reading.9 A third and arguably
narrower reading would limit suits under the Alien Tort Statute to
those that are "universal, definable, and obligatory," 20 and a fourth
reading would limit actionable torts to a still narrower category of
those that violate jus cogens norms.
2 1
As a historical matter, there is something to be said for the first
and most expansive reading, which would authorize federal courts to
recognize new obligations under the law of nations even if these were
not supported by state practice. The first Congress, which enacted
the Alien Tort Statute, viewed the law of nations as resting on natural
law.' Blackstone wrote that "[t]he law of nations is a system of rules,
deducible by natural reason, and established by universal consent
among the civilized inhabitants of the world."' As Justice Story
would subsequently write, "every doctrine, that may be fairly
deduced by correct reasoning from the rights and duties of nations,
and the nature of moral obligation, may theoretically be said to exist
in the law of nations. 24 If determining the law of nations is simply a
matter of "correct reasoning," then courts should be able to
determine its content without regard to state practice.
We live in a more positivist age, however, and modem courts feel
less comfortable "creating" international law than Justice Story did.'
The modem understanding of customary international law is that it
(1820) (The law of nations "may be ascertained by consulting the works of jurists,
writing professedly on public law; or by the general usage and practice of nations; or
by judicial decisions recognizing and enforcing that law.").
19. See Abebe-Jira, 72 F.3d at 847 ("On its face, section 1350 requires the district
courts to hear claims 'by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of
nations.'... We read the statute as requiring no more than an allegation of a
violation of the law of nations in order to invoke section 1350.").
20. Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531,1540 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
21. Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 110 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1304 (C.D. Cal. 2000).
22. Stewart Jay, The Status of the Law of Nations in Early American Law, 42
VAN ). L. REV. 819, 822 (1989).
23. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *66.
24. United States v. The La Jeune Eugenie, 26 F. Cas. 832, 846 (C.C.D. Mass.
1822) (No. 15,551), overruled on other grounds, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66 (1825).
25. See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398,428 (1964):
It should be apparent that the greater the degree of codification or
consensus concerning a particular area of international law, the more
appropriate it is for the judiciary to render decisions regarding it, since the
courts can then focus on the application of an agreed principle to
circumstances of fact rather than on the sensitive task of establishing a
principle not inconsistent with the national interest or with international
justice.
20011
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derives not from reason but from state practice. The Restatement
(Third) of Foreign Relations Law says: "Customary international law
results from a general and consistent practice of states followed by
them from a sense of legal obligation." 26 State practice includes not
only governmental acts but also "official statements of policy."' 7 The
comments explain that "[a] practice can be general even if it is not
universally followed..., but it should reflect wide acceptance among
the states particularly involved in the relevant activity."' As to the
opinio juris aspect of the definition, the Restatement (Third) states
that "[e]xplicit evidence of a sense of legal obligation (e.g., by official
statements) is not necessary; opinio juris may be inferred from acts or
omissions." 29 Even if we confine the law of nations to obligations
derived from state practice, however, the text of the Alien Tort
Statute strongly suggests that jurisdiction should extend to torts in
violation of any such obligation.' As the Eleventh Circuit said in
Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, "[o]n its face, section 1350 requires the district
courts to hear claims 'by an alien for a tort only, committed in
violation of the law of nations.' ... We read the statute as requiring
no more than an allegation of a violation of the law of nations in
order to invoke section 1350."'
3
Perhaps surprisingly, this is not the reading that most courts have
favored. A majority have read jurisdiction under the Alien Tort
Statute as limited to international norms that are "universal,
definable, and obligatory." 32  This interpretation seems to have
originated in a 1981 law review article that sought to insulate the
Filartiga decision from attack by limiting its potential scope to those
torts that were "definable and identifiable as a tort committed by
26. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 102(2) (1987).
27. Id. § 102 cmt. b.
28. Id.
29. Id. § 102 cmt. c.
30. See 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1993) ("The district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of
the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.") (emphasis added).
31. 72 F.3d 844, 847 (1th Cir. 1996).
32. Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531, 1540 (N.D. Cal. 1987); see also
Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 25 F.3d 1467, 1475 (9th Cir. 1994) ("Actionable violations
of international law must be of a norm that is specific, universal, and obligatory.");
Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 110 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1304 (C.D. Cal. 2000) ("Actionable
violations of international law must be of a norm that is specific, universal, and
obligatory."); Beanal v. Freeport-McMoRan, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 362, 370 (E.D. La.
1997) ("To be recognized as an international tort under § 1350, the alleged violation
must be definable, obligatory (rather than hortatory), and universally condemned.").
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individuals,"33  "textually obligatory,"'m  and "universal, so that
derogations are not defended as 'exercises of legitimate political
diversity."'35 Judge Edwards noted these limitations in his Tel-Oren
opinion,' and then Judge Jensen (citing both the law review article
and Judge Edwards) adopted them as the standard for determining
which torts were actionable under the Alien Tort Statute in Forti v.
Suarez Mason. 2
One might argue that the phrase "universal, definable, and
obligatory" is simply a way of restating the requirements for
recognizing a rule of customary international law. But the Forti
formulation is arguably more stringent. Forti's requirement that a
practice be "universal," in particular, seems more stringent than the
Restatement (Third), which requires only that it be "general and
consistent."' Certainly Judge Edwards in Tel-Oren thought that
jurisdiction under the Alien Tort Statute extended only to a subset of
customary international law norms.39 He stressed the "extremely
narrow scope" of the Statute and stated that it reached only "a
handful of heinous actions."' Filartiga's analogy of torture to piracy
and slave-trading, Judge Edwards suggested, showed that the Alien
Tort Statute extended only to offenses that hold "a special place in
the law of nations."'" For a current list of such offenses, Judge
33. Jeffrey M. Blum & Ralph G. Steinhardt, Federal Jurisdiction over
International Human Rights Claims: The Alien Tort Claims Act after Filartiga v. Pena-
Irala, 22 HARv. INT'L L.J. 53, 88 (1981).
34. Id.
35. Id. at 89. The authors concluded that torture, genocide, summary execution,
and slavery met their criteria. Id. at 90.
36. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(Edwards, J., concurring) ("[C]ommentators have begun to identify a handful of
heinous actions-each of which violates definable, universal and obligatory norms
and in the process are defining the limits of section 1350's reach." (citations
omitted)).
37. Forti, 672 F. Supp. at 1540.
38. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 102(2) (1987); see
also id. cmt. b ("A practice can be general even if it is not universally followed ....").
In ruling on a motion to reconsider, Judge Jensen subsequently explained that that
"plaintiffs need not establish uniformity among nations. Rather they must show a
general recognition among states that a specific practice is prohibited." Forti v.
Suarez-Mason, 694 F. Supp. 707, 709 (N.D. Cal. 1988). Nevertheless, Forti's
"universal" requirement has remained and has been followed by a number of courts.
See supra note 32 and accompanying text.




Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
Edwards looked to section 702 of the Restatement (Third),42 most of
which are in fact jus cogens norms.43 But even if limiting jurisdiction
under the Alien Tort Statute to a subset of customary international
law violations were desirable as a matter of policy, it is difficult to find
a textual justification for doing so. The first Congress did not put the
words "universal, definable, and obligatory" in the Alien Tort
Statute; indeed, it provided that jurisdiction would extend to "all
causes where an alien sues for a tort only in violation of the law of
nations or a treaty of the United States." 4
Recently, courts have begun to articulate a fourth, and still
narrower, reading of the Alien Tort Statute, limiting jurisdiction not
simply to rules of customary international law that are "universal,
definable, and obligatory" but to those that constitute jus cogens
norms.45 Jus cogens norms are those "rules of international law [that]
are recognized by the international community of states as
peremptory, permitting no derogation."46  As the Ninth Circuit
42. See id.; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 702
(1987):
A state violates international law if, as a matter of state policy, it practices,
encourages, or condones
(a) genocide,
(b) slavery or slave trade,
(c) the murder or causing the disappearance of individuals,
(d)torture or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or
punishment,
(e) prolonged arbitrary detention,
(f) systematic racial discrimination, or
(g) a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized
human rights.
43. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 702 cmt. n (1987)
("Not all human rights norms are peremptory norms (jus cogens), but those in clauses
(a) to (f) of this section are ...
44. Judiciary Act, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73,77 (1789) (emphasis added).
45. Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 110 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1304 (C.D. Cal. 2000); Nat'l
Coalition Gov't of the Union of Burma v. Unocal, Inc., 176 F.R.D. 329, 345 (C.D.
Cal. 1997); Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 184-89 (D. Mass. 1995); see also
Ryan Goodman & Derek P. Jinks, Filartiga's Firm Footing: International Human
Rights and Federal Common Law, 66 FORDHAM L. REv. 463, 495 (1997) (arguing
that, as a practical matter, alien tort suits are limited to jus cogens violations).
46. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 102 cmt. k (1987); see
also Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 53, 1155 U.N.T.S.
332, 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969) ("For the purposes of the present Convention, a peremptory
norm of general international law is a norm accepted and recognized by the
international community of states as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is
permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general
international law having the same character.").
[Vol. 24:351
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pointed out in Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, a nation is
bound by jus cogens norms even if it does not consent to them.47
Although Judge Edwards had pointed to a set of jus cogens rules
in Tel-Oren as illustrative of those torts that were actionable under
the Alien Tort Statute, ' the jus cogens reading of the Statute seems to
stem not from Tel-Oren but from a misreading of Siderman. In
Siderman, the Ninth Circuit held that the prohibition against torture
was a jus cogens norm but that there was no jus cogens exception to
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act that would allow a plaintiff to
bring suit against a foreign government on that basis alone.49 Shortly
thereafter in Trajano v. Marcos, the Ninth Circuit relied on Siderman
in rejecting the argument that the Alien Tort Statute did not provide
jurisdiction over torture claims:
Regardless of the extent to which other principles may
appropriately be relied upon, the prohibition against official torture
"carries with it the force of ajus cogens norm," which .'enjoy[s] the
highest status within international law."'... We therefore conclude
that the district court did not err in founding jurisdiction on a
violation of the jus cogens norm prohibiting official torture.S°
In the course of confirming that torture claims were cognizable
because the prohibition against torture is a jus cogens norm, Trajano
seemed to cast doubt on the actionability of other rules of customary
international law, and several subsequent district court decisions
seem to have adopted a jus cogens standard. 1
It is as hard to justify limiting jurisdiction under the Alien Tort
47. 965 F.2d 699,715-16 (9th Cir. 1992). By contrast, a state that dissents from an
ordinary customary international law rule during its development is not bound by
that rule. Id. at 715; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 102 cmt.
d (1987).
48. See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
49. 965 F.2d at 717-19.
50. 978 F.2d at 500 (quoting Siderman, 965 F.2d at 715,717).
51. See Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 184-89 (D. Mass. 1995) (discussing
plaintiffs' claims under the heading "Peremptory Norms of International Law");
Nat'l Coalition Gov't of the Union of Burma v. Unocal, Inc., 176 F.R.D. 329, 345
(C.D. Cal. 1997) (holding that expropriation was not actionable under the Alien Tort
Statute because it "does not constitute a jus cogens violation of the law of nations");
Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 110 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1304 (C.D. Cal. 2000) ("While the Ninth
Circuit has not expressly held that only jus cogens norms are actionable, the Circuit's
holding in Estate II that actionable violations are only those that are specific,
universal, and obligatory is consistent with this interpretation."). But see Iwanowa v.
Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d 424,440 n.18 (D.N.J. 1999) (holding that forced labor
claims are actionable even if they do not violate jus cogens).
20011
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
Statute to jus cogens norms as it is to justify limiting the Statute to
rules that are "universal, definable, and obligatory." It bears
repeating that the first Congress extended jurisdiction to "all causes
where an alien sues for a tort only in violation of the law of nations or
a treaty of the United States. 52 When the Alien Tort Statute was
passed in 1789, the law of nations did not recognize any separate
category of jus cogens.5 Moreover, although assaults on ambassadors
were clearly among the torts in violation of the law of nations that the
first Congress meant to reach,'M it is not clear that such assaults violate
jus cogens norms today.5 Limiting jurisdiction under the Alien Tort
Statute to jus cogens norms cannot, therefore, be justified either on
the basis of its text or the intentions of the first Congress. It is a
limitation that has been judicially imposed.
Judges seem most inclined to read additional limitations into the
Alien Tort Statute when pressed by plaintiffs to extend the Statute to
new torts and new defendants. Judge Edwards stressed the
"extremely narrow scope" of the Statute in Tel-Oren ,56 a case in which
plaintiffs had asked the court to extend the prohibition against torture
to a non-state actor (the Palestinian Liberation Organization) and to
recognize terrorism as a violation of the law of nations. Judge
Jensen adopted the "universal, definable, and obligatory"
52. Judiciary Act, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73,77 (1789) (emphasis added).
53. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 102 reporters'
note 6 (1987) ("The concept of jus cogens is of relatively recent origin."). Although
writers had long discussed the idea of a non-derogable international law, "the
writings on the subject have been theoretical statements by learned authors, not
substantiated by references to rulings or international courts or tribunals, to less
authoritative state practice, or to diplomatic proceedings or correspondence." Egon
Schwelb, Some Aspects of International Jus Cogens as Formulated by the
International Law Commission, 61 AM. J. INT'L L. 946, 949 (1967). The acceptance of
jus cogens into international law stems from the work of the International Law
Commission and the Vienna Conference on the Law of Treaties in the 1960s. See
IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 516 (5th ed. 1998).
54. A 1784 attack on the French Consul General in Philadelphia seems to have
been the most direct impetus for including the Alien Tort Statute in the first
Judiciary Act. See Dodge, supra note 1, at 229-30. Blackstone also listed
"[i]nfringement of the rights of embassadors" among the "principal offences against
the law of nations." BLACKSTONE, supra note 23, at *68.
55. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 102 reporters'
note 6 (1987) ("[Jus cogens] norms might include rules prohibiting genocide, slave
trade and slavery, apartheid and other gross violations of human rights, and perhaps
attacks on diplomats." (emphasis added)).
56. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(Edwards, J., concurring).
57. Id. at 795-96 (Edwards, J., concurring).
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formulation in Forti v. Suarez-Mason,5 a case in which the court was
asked to recognize cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment and
causing disappearance as customary international law violations. 9
And, most recently, Judge Lew adopted the jus cogens requirement in
Doe I v. Unocal Corporation,'4 a case in which he was asked to
recognize forced labor as a violation of the law of nations and to
enforce that prohibition against a domestic corporation. 1 Judges
seem uneasy with suits involving "new" torts that go beyond the
paradigmatic, Filartiga-like, torture case and have responded by
raising the standard for determining which torts are actionable under
the Alien Tort Statute.
The standard that seems most consistent with the Alien Tort
Statute's text and the views of the Congress that enacted it, however,
is that jurisdiction extends to all torts that violate customary
international law-not just those that are "universal, definable, and
obligatory" and not just those that violate a jus cogens norm. The
first Congress recognized that the law of nations had evolved over
time and expected that it would continue to do so.62 This notion was
endorsed by the 102nd Congress when it passed the Torture Victim
Protection Act, which extended jurisdiction over claims of torture and
extrajudicial killing to include suits by U.S. citizens. 6  The House
Report accompanying the act explains: "[C]laims based on torture or
summary executions do not exhaust the list of actions that may
appropriately be covered [by] section 1350. That statute should
remain intact to permit suits based on other norms that already exist
or may ripen in the future into rules of customary international law.
'" 64
I am not certain that all of the torts alleged in the "second wave"
of alien tort litigation are in fact violations of modern customary
international law. I am certain, however, that courts should not
substitute their own policy views for those of Congress and confine
the Alien Tort Statute to a subcategory of torts in violation of the law
58. Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531, 1540 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
59. Id. at 1542-43.
60. 110 F. Supp. 2d 1294,1304 (C.D. Cal. 2000).
61. Id. at 1307-10.
62. See Dodge, supra note 1, at 241-43.
63. Pub. L. No. 256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1993)).
64. H.R. REP. No. 367, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4 (1991), reprinted in 4
U.S.C.C.A.N. 84, 86 (1992) (emphasis added); see also Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630
F.2d 876, 881 (2d Cir. 1980) ("[I]t is clear that courts must interpret international law
not as it was in 1789, but as it has evolved and exists among the nations of the world
today.").
2001]
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of nations. If plaintiffs can prove the existence of a customary
international law rule resulting from "a general and consistent
practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal obligation"'65
and can prove that corporate defendants have committed torts in
violation of such a rule, courts have a duty to exercise jurisdiction and
impose liability under the Alien Tort Statute.
65. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 102(2) (1987).
[Vol. 24:351
